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Abstract 
This paper presents an investigation of global recovery from the great recession and rebalancing of 
global external imbalances, using a global model of sixteen countries and composite regions. The model 
applies to the short run, and only to the real side. Key features are demand-driven output 
determination, pro-cyclical aggregate labor productivity, imperfect competition in product markets and 
simple bargaining in non-clearing labor markets, which together determine the functional distribution of 
income. Trade is modeled in a bilateral import matrix; particular attention is paid to international 
adjustment. Simulation results suggest that early exit from fiscal support threatens a fragile recovery. 
Further, domestic demand expansion and revaluation in real terms in surplus countries are necessary for 
rebalancing, and a variety of measures can be employed to achieve these goals. 
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1. Introduction 
The Great Recession, emanating from US real estate and financial markets, has cost a multitude of 
jobs all around the world. The financial panic of 2008 and 2009 destroyed vast amounts of wealth, and 
threatens to solidify a trend of increasing inequality within countries. Much ink has been spilled on the 
various factors feeding into the crisis.  
High on the list is lax financial regulation. Furthermore, after the new economy bubble burst, longer 
term global interest rates remained suppressed due to policy driven purchases of developed country 
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factors led to a lending frenzy. Wall Street recycled the world’s surpluses to US households via subprime 
loans, and to Eastern Europe as well as the Southern Eurozone, via German, French and Austrian banks. 
In the process, bankers and shadow bankers everywhere also lent to each other, to lever up. Quite 
classically, when the asset side of their balance sheets deteriorated, or they couldn’t roll over their 
liabilities, or both, banks faced a maturity, a currency or a maturity and a currency mismatch.  
In this view, external imbalances are an important feature of the crisis, even if certainly not the sole 
driver. Since neither the US’s private nor Greece’s public sector are willing or able to take on further 
debt, reduction of imbalances must as well be a feature of a sustainable recovery.1 That is clearly in 
deficit countries’ interest: The lower external deficit implies stabilization of foreign debt; if the reduction 
can be achieved without a recession, it implies as well decreases in unemployment. Surplus countries 
are, unsurprisingly, less enthusiastic. They could, however, benefit from a reduction in global imbalances 
if higher domestic demand replaces external demand. As such, rebalancing should aid recovery, in the 
sense that it is more than a redistribution of global demand. In this paper, we use a Keynesian multi-
region model to investigate whether commonly suggested routes to rebalancing and recovery can be 
successful. In the following sections we present a global data set, the model and simulations.  
2. A data set of the (real) world economy 
The global data set constructed for this paper covers a large share of the world’s national 
economies—one hundred and sixty countries. Their relative size and their geographical trade 
relationships play a crucial role. The model dataset is aggregated into sixteen countries and regions; the 
countries are US, Japan, Canada, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa),2 the 
regions Africa, Asia, Eurozone, the rest of Europe, and Latin America and the Carribean.3 Countries with 
more than half of their exports concentrated in petroleum and related products as well as natural gas 
are grouped together. Asia and the Eurozone are further disaggregated into surplus and deficit regions. 
Especially the latter has for a while been largely in external balance, but, as has become abundantly 
clear, Eurozone internal imbalances are sizable, and do matter.  
The national accounts data is presented in Table 1. The base year of the national accounts data is 
2008; for these and all other data see the appendix for further details on sources and procedures. The 
table reports GDP and related shares for aggregates and the sixteen model countries and regions. The 
developed world consists of the US, Europe, Japan and Canada. In the lower part, Europe disaggregates 
into three regions, Eurozone surplus countries, Eurozone deficit countries, and the rest of Europe. The 
next bloc shows developing countries. The last item shows a composite region of energy exporters, 
which are heterogeneous geographically and on an income basis, but have in common high ratios of 
energy to total exports. The fifth, sixth and seventh column report private, public and external balances 
                                                          
1
 We will not review the literature on the causes of global imbalances. The most compelling arguments have emphasized the 
role of US debt-driven private demand. See Barbosa-Filho, Rada, Taylor, and Zamperelli (2008), Papadimitriou, Chilcote and 
Zezza (2006). Von Arnim (2009) discusses these and other main hypotheses. 
2
 The original BRICs do not include South Africa. Since South Africa is so crucial an economy on the African continent, it is 
included here individually and added to the “BRIC.”  
3
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relative to GDP. Private plus public minus external balance adds to zero; if not, it is due to rounding. For 
the World in the first row, the “external deficit” of -2.6 per cent is the cumulative external balance of all 
deficit countries relative to World GDP, obviously mirrored by the remaining countries’s cumulative 
surplus.4 It gives an indication of the infamous global imbalances. The remaining columns show savings, 
taxes and export revenue relative to GDP, as well as exports relative to global exports. A few quick 
insights can be gleaned from this data. World GDP (in the model aggregation) adds to roughly 60trn US 
dollars, two thirds of which stem from developed countries, another sixteen per cent from the BRICS, 
five from energy exporters and the remaining thirteen from developing countries. The US has overall a 
low savings rate; Japan, energy exporters, the RIC of the BRICS and Eurozone surplus countries feature 
high savings rates. High private demand in the US finds its expression in a high external deficit, energy 
and manufacturing exporters feature the matching surpluses.  
Labor market data is summarized by the unemployment rate. It is based on population, labor force, 
employment and unemployment data from national statistics offices, regional development banks as 
well as ILO’s Laborsta and Eapep databases. Reported unemployment rates are used where available, 
estimates based on the highest quality underlying data where not. All unemployment rates are for 2008, 
as is the rest of the data. US unemployment, for example, averaged below six per cent for the year of 
2008. Of course, the rate has since risen to about ten per cent. Is our data out of date? It is always 
difficult to compile large and up to date data sets. Results can still be interpreted with current conditions 
in mind since what matters most are the relative size of the economies, their external economic 
relationships, as well as the direction of change of, for example, unemployment rates.  
The bilateral trade data is presented in Table 2. The table shows levels of country-by-country 
(region-by-region) exports and imports in billions of 2008 US dollars. Read along rows, the table reports 
exports; read along columns, it reports imports. Rows 17 through 19 indicate export, imports and the 
difference between them—since we are abstracting from income payments and transfer, this is equal to 
the current account. The lower part of the table reports bilateral import propensities in percentage 
points, so that the column sums at the bottom show country and region aggregate import propensities. 
In levels, the largest economies show the largest volumes of exports and imports. Only the US and China 
are large enough to show large trade volumes as individual countries; otherwise, composite regions 
weigh heavily, and regional links are apparent. In shares, however, the regional links become still more 
important. The strongest trade links appear within the three European regions (plus Russia), within the 
five Asian regions (India, China, Japan, plus rest of Asia surplus and deficit regions), within the Americas 
(Canada, US, Latin America and Carribean plus Brazil) as well as from the world to energy exporters. 
Africa—both South Africa and the rest of Africa, excluding energy exporters—show the least integration 
with the world economy, though Africa’s highest degree of integration is apparent vis-à-vis the 
                                                          
4
 Due to reporting problems, real world data often shows that global exports are not equal global imports. The trade data in the 
IMF trade matrix has been adjusted to correct this, which implies that the sum of all countries’ external positions is equal to 
zero. The statistic here—the sum of external deficits of all countries that have an external deficit—is included to provide a 
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European regions. As will be seen in the next section, the transmission of shocks throughout the world 
economy is crucially tied to this regionally dominated trade structure.  
Next, we discuss the model to which this dataset is applied.  
3. A global model of demand and distributive conflict 
The model falls within the general category of empirical economy-wide models, often labeled, 
slightly misleadingly, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.5 Its structure fits broadly in the 
tradition of Rowthorn (1982), Dutt (1984), and Taylor (1985), even though the rate of accumulation is 
exogenous. Of course, one might desire an investment function. Empirically, however, they tend to be 
unreliable, and elasticities are sparse for the large set of countries put together here. An exogenous rate 
of accumulation renders domestic demand always wage-led, since an increase in real wages (not 
matched by productivity increases) feeds into consumption, but does not reduce capital accumulation. 
If, on the other hand, investment were sensitive to changes in profitability—or, equivalently, real unit 
labor costs—then a strong decrease in investment compared to the increase in consumption could 
render demand profit-led. However, as households in the North are struggling to reduce debt to income 
ratios, and households in the South (and East) have huge potential for consumption catch up, it might 
indeed be reasonable to assume demand to be wage led.  
Product and labor markets are covered in simple but comprehensive fashion. The size of the mark-
up depends on the degree of competition in product markets. High mark-ups, of course, imply high 
profit shares. Demand is a function of expenditure levels, the multiplier and the real exchange rate. The 
multiplier increases with redistribution towards wage earners, due to their lower propensity to save. It 
changes as well with prices: All else equal, higher domestic prices imply a real appreciation and a higher 
import share—which lowers the multiplier. A real appreciation has as well a negative impact on the level 
of external demand. In that fashion, expenditures, prices and distribution all affect value added. 
Households, in turn, earn labor and capital income—meaning there are really two, namely owners and 
employees. They bargain in labor markets over nominal wages, the single argument being the rate of 
employment in a simple wage curve. Further, labor productivity depends on demand conditions, due to 
labor hoarding as well as overhead labor.  The ratio of the real wage and labor productivity is equal to 
real unit labor cost. The higher the worker’s real wage relative to her productivity, the higher is the 
wage share.  
In the following paragraphs, we present first a one-country version, then discuss dynamic stability in 
two dimensions, and briefly consider issues pertaining to the multi-region model.  
A one-country version  
Let us begin here with the underlying accounting. First,  
                                                          
5
 A CGE model is based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), which depicts detailed data on relations of production and 
distribution between main socio-economic agents in an economy. The model adds behavioral relationships to the accounting; 
econometric evidence is applied to calibrate relevant parameters. The complete model can then be used to calculate 
counterfactuals in response to assumed shocks and policies. For standard discussions of the methodology, the pioneering 
contributions by Taylor (1979, 1983), as well as Pyatt (1988) or Robinson (2003). A previous discussion of this paper is available 
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is GDP at factor cost.   is real GDP,  the GDP deflator.  is the nominal wage rate and   an index of 
(hourly) employment, so that   is the wage bill. Similarly,   is the rate of profit, and    the stock of 





   
  
    , 
where  is wage and   profit share. Without intermediates, adding import to factor costs gives total 
cost, which is equal to total supply:  
                          ,  
where the subscript f indicates the foreign country, and real exports   are the imports of the foreign 
country from this economy, valued at the domestic supply price  . Household income, in turn,  
               
is divided between consumption    and taxes and savings,        .  
Government saving is  
         , 
where   is the uniform net tax rate and   are real government expenditures.   , of course, tends to be 
negative. Foreign saving is 
                 
the negative of the current account.   is the nominal exchange rate, quoted as the domestic currency 
price of one unit of foreign currency. Private saving     is the sum of savings out of wage and profit 
income,               , so that the aggregate propensity to save can be written as a negative 
function of the wage share,  
             .  
The price of a unit of GDP, , is the mark-up price on nominal unit labor costs. Writing average labor 
productivity      , nominal unit labor costs are        , the mark-up price follows as  




where   is the mark-up rate, and            .  The mark-up price goes back to Kalecki; see Lee 
(1998), Part III, for an extensive survey. The supply price   follows from cost accounting. Imports can be 
written as    , and since         , the supply price can be expressed as the weighted 
average of the price of domestic content and import prices,  
             .  
  as a cost price is anchored by factor prices. Pass-through of exchange rate shocks or foreign 
inflation is limited, but plays an important role in determining domestic price changes and therewith 
real exchange rate changes. Next, the nominal wage rate  is determined by a simple wage curve, 
according to which a higher employment rate leads to higher bargained wage levels,  
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where   is an ‘intercept,’   the bargaining elasticity, and     the employment rate. See Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1990, 1994), as well as Carlin and Soskice (1990).6 The profit rate   follows as a positive 
function of the profit share, the rate of capacity utilization       and the price ratio   ,  
  








Let us now consider demand, savings, productivity and labor demand in turn. Total supply is 
          . With               and         , GDP is            , with 
the multiplier 
  
   
                 
.  
Real imports     are a function of the real exchange rate         and production  ,  
     
      ,  
where   is an ‘intercept,’ and   and   are price and income elasticity of import demand.   
In the short run, labor productivity   increases in the rate of capacity utilization,  
     
  ,  
due to labor hoarding as well as overhead labor. Labor hoarding refers to the fact that firms retain 
skilled employees throughout a downturn because retraining new employees in the upturn would be 
costlier; overhead labor refers to the fact that firms usually have some back-office and managerial staff 





This labor demand function is consistent with fixed proportions technology and varying unit labor 
requirements, and implies Okun’s Law, since pro-cyclical labor productivity dampens the employment 
effect of a demand expansion. Now, we can investigate dynamic stability in two dimensions.  
Dynamic stability 
A dynamic version of the model is presented here in the rate of capacity utilization and the share of 
labor income. We present this stylized model in order to emphasize key macroeconomic adjustment 
mechanisms. How does it relate to the version above? The dynamic version describes one country 
(instead of many regions) with a real wage curve (instead of a nominal wage curve and a full price 
system)7 and a net export function that responds to real unit labor costs (instead of import functions 
responsive to real exchange rate changes). The advantage is that we can consider stability in two 
                                                          
6
 Workers (or unions) bargain for nominal rather than real wages—they can only influence the former, even if they have the 
latter in mind: “*A…+ fundamental objection *… to classical theory of employment+ flows from our disputing the assumption that 
the general level of real wages is directly determined by the character of the wage bargain.” (my emphasis, see Keynes 1936, 
chapter 2, p.13.) A standard specification used today features the nominal wage deflated by the expected price level as a 
function of the employment rate, see Carlin and Soskice (1990), chapter 6 as well as 17 and references therein. Since the model 
applied here abstracts from expectations, we specify the nominal wage as a function of the employment rate. Together with 
cost-driven and thus “anchored” output prices, this implies an upward sloping bargained real wage curve in real wage-
employment space; consistent with Fig.6.1 on page 139 of Carlin and Soskice (1990). Similarly, Flaschel (2009) emphasizes the 
theoretical and empirical relevance of specifying separate wage and price functions, which will then combine to determine the 
real wage.  
7
 See as well footnote 6 above: The purpose of assuming a real wage curve in this section is to reduce dimensionality. The core 
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dimensions, and focus on what matters. First, the dynamic goods market specification is a simple excess 
demand function. Second, inflation is fundamentally driven by conflict, which is here expressed in terms 
of the functional distribution of income. With simple adaptive dynamics (and endogenous equilibrium 
values for the rate of utilization and the labor share), the time paths of the dynamic version will 
converge to the comparative static equilibria, bar the simplifications, of course. Hence, the principal 
structure of the two models is the same. 
Let us first consider a closed economy. The investment rate is assumed exogenous, but the rate of 
accumulation permitted by savings depends on utilization and distribution, 
 
 
   , and  
 
 
 (           ) .  
Dynamic adjustment in the goods market is standard. Excess demand triggers firms to increase the 
rate of utilization. Since       , this can be written as  
 ̇   (
  
 [ ]
  ),  
where   is a sign-preserving speed of adjustment parameter. With the rate of utilization the adjusting 
variable, the dynamics best describe the short run.8  
A generic wage curve describes bargaining,  




with   the employment rate, and   the technologically determined full employment capital labor ratio. 
In what follows, we set     for simplicity. Generically, endogenous labor productivity is  
   [ ].  
The price and distribution system can be described by the dynamics of the wage share. Following 
the theory of conflict inflation (Rowthorn (1977), Taylor (1991)), prices and distributive shares are 
subject to class conflict, so that the change in the wage share becomes  
 ̇   (
 [   [ ]]
  [ ]
  ),  
with   as well a sign-preserving speed of adjustment parameter. The bargained nominal wage rises with 
higher demand, but falls with higher productivity due to the negative effect on employment. The 
differential equation simply means that real wage increases in excess of productivity increases lead to a 
higher wage share. Note that we will assume here that inflation is constant (or zero); in other words, we 
consider a real wage curve.9 The dynamic behavior of the system can be summarized in the Jacobian  
  (




    
),  
                                                          
8
 See Lavoie (1995) for a discussion of the role of the rate of utilization in Kaleckian and Ricardian models. Related, and more 
recently, Skott (2008) argues that the rate of utilization can not be a long–run accommodating variable. 
9
 The response of prices to utilization depends as well on the relative strength of the wage and productivity response to higher 
utilization. Nominal unit labor costs fall if productivity responds more strongly than wages, and vice versa. The system could be 
set up in the rate of utilization and prices and would show the same dynamics. Since the derivation is somewhat more 

















anuscript          
University of Utah Institutional Repository  
Author Manuscript 
Page 8 of 25 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The sign of the upper right entry is positive (    ), and 
determines the demand regime as wage-led. The sign of the lower left entry determines the distributive 
regime:  
     (       
 
 
    )  
is either greater or smaller than zero. Since both entries on the main diagonal are negative,     would 
ensure a positive determinant. The system is then stable with wage-led led demand and forced saving 




     ,   
which is certainly satisfied, even with substantial difference in class saving rates and a private sector 
deficit, as long as   is not “large.”   
Let us now include net exports. The change in the utilization rate can be written as  
  ̇   (
     [  ]
 [ ]
  ),  
where             is the ratio of net exports to the capital stock. It responds negatively to 
utilization and real unit labor costs. This is surely a stylized net export function, but since domestic wage 
increases lead to a higher price level and real appreciation, the assumed mechanism is not too far 
fetched. See Naastepad (2006) for extensive discussion of a model with a similar set up. The first row of 
the Jacobian changes:  









    
),  
where  
   (  
    
 )  
can take either sign. (Note that   
     .) If negative, reduced real unit labor costs have a stimulating 
effect, because the increase in external demand outweighs the decrease in consumption. This case 
corresponds to a profit-led demand regime,     is wage–led.  Since   
   , the upper left entry is still 
negative, and larger in magnitude: Imports stabilize quantity adjustment. As a result, the trace remains 
negative. For the sign of the determinant, two cases need to be distinguished: If   and   are of opposite 
sign,   [ ]   , and the system is stable. If   and   are of same sign,   [ ]    if     
    . The 
potential instability in the second case arises due to the positive feedback, for example, from higher 
costs through wage-led demand to higher demand, and from higher demand via profit squeeze to higher 
wage shares. As above, the own feedback channels tend to be stronger than the distributive-demand 
links, certainly making the sum     
  larger than the product   .  
The multi-region model: International closure and calibration  
The multi-region model has the same structure as the simple model presented above. The equations 
of the multi-region model are listed in Table 3. Here, we want to focus on bilateral trade and exchange 
rates. Each country features a real import demand function vis-à-vis any other country, with the bilateral 
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imports and exports follow from the relevant aggregation: Summation across all other countries’ 
imports from this country implies an aggregate export function; summation across all other countries’ 
exports to this country implies an aggregate import function. See Equation 12 in Table 3 for the latter. 
Let us as well briefly consider the system of exchange rates. Note that there are two regions for the 
Eurozone, both of which of course share the same currency—which means that there are        
exchange rates. Given that the US dollar serves as the world reserve currency, it makes sense to express 
all exchange rates in terms of it. As an example, real exchange rates between three countries and the US 
indexed as country   can be written as 
 [   ]  
 [   ] [ ]
 [ ]
,  [   ]  
 
 [   ]
 
 [ ]
 [   ] [ ]
,  [   ]  
 [   ] [ ]
 [   ] [ ]
,  
and analogously for all other countries. The important implication is that a model with sixteen regions 
with fifteen currencies has only fourteen degrees of freedom in international accounts, but twenty nine 
candidate variables: The fourteen exchange rates as well as fifteen current accounts. Simulation 
scenarios and simulation results depend crucially on international “closure” assumptions. A system 
similar to the one suggested here has been used in von Arnim (2009). That as this one is a 
straightforward multi-country extension of standard income- and elasticities approaches in open 
economy macroeconomics. Here, the focus will be on fixed nominal exchange rates and endogenous 
current accounts.  
Before we move on to scenario analysis, let us explain the calibration of crucial parameters. We 
should distinguish between accounting and behavioral parameters. Accounting parameters are implied 
by data; examples include tax rates as well as macroeconomic savings propensities. The distribution of 
savings between wage and profit recipients (   and    , however, is not set by the data, and therefore 
behavioral. Other behavioral parameters are the employment rate elasticity of nominal wages (   , the 
demand elasticity of labor productivity (   , and price and income elasticities of imports.  
We estimate these trade elasticities for many countries in our data set, and apply GDP-weighted 
averages to the relevant regions.10 For the savings parameters, we assume that profit income recipients 
save twice as much as wage income recipients.11 We set the demand elasticity of productivity       , 
which implies  ̂       ̂.12 Broadly in line with Okun’s and Verdoorn’s Laws, employment grows only a 
bit more than half as fast as demand.13 Lastly, we set       . Ideally, of course, all these elasticities 
should be estimated for each single country.  
                                                          
10
 The elasticities applied are uniform across trade partners. Ideally, trade elasticities should be bilateral, but the data 
requirements for the estimations are exorbitant, and we have to content ourselves with what is available.   
11
 Equation 15 in Table 3 offers one degree of freedom, the second—to determine both    and   —comes from the 
assumption about the relationship between the two parameters. Given levels of base year GDP and savings as well as the profit 
share, we can then solve for    and   .  
12
 A ‘hat’ over a variable denotes a proportional growth rate.  
13
 For recent empirical discussions of these matters, see the seminal collection in McCombie et.al. (2003), as well as Chen et.al. 
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For this paper, our focus is on trade elasticities, so that we complement the discussion with 
sensitivity analysis of selected parameters.14 See Figure 1. As expected, an increase in the average 
employment rate elasticity of nominal wages   across countries increases the world GDP growth 
rate—since demand is wage-led, a higher increase in nominal wages presents further gains. Similarly, an 
increase in the average ratio of class savings propensities       leads to higher GDP growth—since 
demand is wage-led, similar class behavior reduces the impact of redistribution on the multiplier. Lastly, 
we test the impact of changes in the US trade elasticity. Overall, these tests suggest that simulation 
results are not dominated by reasonably expected variations on these parameters.  
4. Scenarios 
This section reports simulation results. Four scenarios are considered, all with an eye towards 
effects on global growth and imbalances. We begin with a reduction of US government borrowing, often 
touted as the solution to US external imbalances. However, as will be seen, improvements in external 
balance come at a significant cost in terms of output and employment. Second, a revaluation of China’s 
currency vis-à-vis the US dollar is necessary in the medium run to support rebalancing, but in the short 
run might not help as much as often hoped. Third, incomes and social policies in Asia’s surplus countries 
can aid rebalancing and support global recovery. Fourth, we consider coordinated policies between Asia 
and Europe. In addition to the policy changes applied in scenario 3, we introduce nominal wage 
increases and fiscal expansion in European surplus countries. Table 6 presents an overview of key 
macroeconomic statistics for all four scenarios, and Tables 7-10 more detailed results for each in turn.  
Reduction of US public deficit  
There are several reasons to consider a reduction of US public borrowing. The political pressure to 
reduce public debt is immense, even in the face of continued high unemployment. It is often said that 
the US’s profligate ways have to change, that her overall rate of saving has to increase. Without that, the 
argument goes, the external deficit cannot be corrected. Reducing government dissaving is one way to 
do that, one that plays into entrenched beliefs about twin (public and external) deficits.15 To implement 
this simulation, the ratio of the public deficit to GDP in the US is decreased by two percentage points, 
from the base year value of 6.6 per cent to 4.6 per cent. (Note that the government deficit usually is 
endogenous, but now fixed, and real government expenditures are made flexible to achieve this target.) 
Simulation results are shown in Table 7.16 
The immediate effect is a sizable contraction of GDP in the US. The US unemployment rate increases 
by three percentage points. US external balance relative to GDP improves by about 1.4 percentage 
                                                          
14
 For sensitivity analysis, we calibrate the model with the behavioral parameter under consideration drawn from a uniform 
probability distribution with appropriate bounds, and repeatedly solve the model subject to a generic shock. See Figure 1 for 
further details, and von Arnim (2011) for a similar procedure applied to a structurally similar model.  
15
 The argument works through the interest channel: budget deficits push up interest rates which lead to portfolio investment 
and exchange appreciation. The resulting trade deficit adds to global imbalances. Salvatore (2007) investigates the case 
empirically; Mussa (2007) suggests that particularly in the US case, this is “largely nonsense.” See as well Barbosa-Filho et.al. 
(2008) for evidence that private and external deficit coincided over the relevant period.  
16
 The aggregation in the results tables (6 through 10) differs from the regional aggregation fed into the model. This is for the 
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points. A success? Not so: Real exports actually decrease, while real imports fall by much more. Due to 
the slight real depreciation real exports decrease more moderately than those of other countries. 
Specifically, improvement in the current account is the result of reduced income and import demand. 
This reduction of external demand for the rest of the world is sufficiently large to induce a global 
downturn.  
Regional trade links are important for the international transmission of the shock. The US is by far 
the most important export market for both Canada and Latin America and the Carribean. About three 
quarters of all exports from Canada go to the US, from Latin America about half. The sharp decrease of 
total import volume makes these two regions particularly vulnerable to the US downturn. Their negative 
GDP growth rates rank second, for Latin America, and third for Canada behind the US, where the shock 
originates. Because the US and Canada weigh heavily among developed countries, the recession is more 
pronounced there than in developing countries, even though Japan and Europe are not much affected.  
Globally, the contraction of demand does lead to correction of global imbalances by one fifth of a 
percentage point of world GDP. However, it comes at a significant cost. The global increase in 
unemployment rates does not bode well for a sustained recovery from the crisis with early exit from 
fiscal support.  
To summarize, let us emphasize the relevant chain of causation: First, the US reduces domestic 
demand. The country falls into recession. GDP decreases, and the unemployment rate rises. Through the 
demand channel, US imports fall, which spreads the contraction particularly to important trade 
partners. On the price side, wages—key cost item—fall, which leads to deflation. This is most 
pronounced in the US, where the shock emanates. As a result, the country’s external price 
competitiveness improves, which buffers the decrease in real exports from demand contraction in the 
rest of the world. Overall, quantity effects rule, as would be expected in a demand-driven model.  
Next, we consider a price shock.  
Revaluation of China’s currency 
Chinese monetary authorities have accumulated tremendous amounts of US dollar reserves in their 
efforts to maintain a stable and competitive exchange rate. The current account surplus relative to GDP 
has steadily increased, and in 2008 stood at about nine per cent of GDP. The US-China bilateral current 
account features prominently, with about 150bn USD worth of goods and services more sold to the US 
from China than vice versa. Attempting to counteract negative effects of the global crisis, currency 
policy had “re-stiffened” in late 2008, after a period of somewhat faster nominal appreciation. 
Currently, the Chinese yuan is traded in a carefully designed daily band.  
 What would revaluation of the Chinese currency do for global rebalancing? The simulation is 
implemented through a twenty percent increase of the US dollar price of one Chinese yuan. Since all 
other nominal exchange rates are assumed unchanged, this implies a nominal appreciation of China’s 
currency by almost 17 per cent against all other region’s currencies. The result is a real effective 
appreciation of about fourteen per cent. As a result, the current account to GDP ratio increases from 9 
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short run, revualation does not do much for reducing global imbalances. In fact, relative to the base 
year, global imbalances increase, even if only marginally.17  
In the US, on the other hand, the real depreciation of about 1.8 per cent is contractionary. Real 
depreciation can be contractionary if trade elasticities are low, and the shock transmission through 
regional trade links does not work in favor of the country under consideration. For the US, both are the 
case. Not only is her import price elasticity relatively low, but Latin America—together with Canada, 
both at roughly twenty per cent—represents a crucial export market; in this simulation Latin America 
shows the second worst GDP growth performance.  
In summary, currency depreciation in the US does not lead to an increase in real exports, since trade 
elasticities of key trade partners are too low, but does lead to a higher import bill. The result is 
contraction. In China, currency appreciation reduces net exports, and triggers contraction. On the price 
side, China experiences deflation, whereas the US imports inflation. These results probably should be 
qualified. There are good reasons to believe that the J-curve will turn. Over the medium run, sectoral 
reallocation can take place, and will aid adjustment.  
What does it all mean for China? The unemployment rate rises by more than one and a half 
percentage points. The socio-economic implications of the lack of continued strong formal sector job 
growth make this a difficult political option to pursue. There are, however, alternative policies that do 
not have this negative impact, and have greater potential to aid reduction of global imbalances. One 
example might be income policies in Asian surplus countries.  
Rebalancing Asia  
For Asia, the rebound from the radically fast and sharp drop in external demand has been 
surprisingly short. Deepening regional integration plays a role, as does the growth of domestic markets. 
Significant fiscal stimulus has as well helped to mitigate adverse effects, and it represents a step in the 
direction of rebalancing demand towards domestic sources. What beyond fiscal stimulus can the region 
do to aid global rebalancing without endangering recovery? This simulation emphasizes the positive 
effects of higher social spending and improved social security nets. Ideally, transfer of social insurance to 
the public provides an immediate double benefit—the initial increase in spending and a resulting 
decrease in precautionary saving rates from lower income households. The policy changes are 
implemented here in the Asian surplus region (AS) and China (BR4) as a decrease of the net tax rate and 
a decrease in the propensity to save of wage earning households. Additionally, it is assumed that overall 
nominal wages increase. Such a shift further supports domestic consumption, without directly hurting 
external competitiveness through nominal exchange appreciation.18  
                                                          
17
 Imbalances improve—in the sense that they become smaller, whether initially positive or negative—only in Japan, Canada, 
Brazil, Russia, China and energy exporting countries. These improvements are often small. Here, as in the previous scenario, we 
focus on US-China economic relations.  
18
 Tax rates are net of transfers, see the appendix for details. An increase in social transfers can be modeled by a decrease of 
this rate. It is decreased by 10 per cent. The propensity to save of wage earners is lowered by 10 per cent; assumed to be a 
result of improved social security (and therefore lower personal savings requirements). Nominal wages are shocked upward by 
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Results are presented in Table 9, and are clearly globally reflationary. For the rest of the world, 
higher growth in Asia represents increased external demand. Global imbalances are reduced slightly. 
China grows strongly at almost 4 per cent. China’s current account surplus relative to GDP falls 
significantly compared to the base year, from 9 to 6.7 per cent. The Asian aggregate region grows as well 
at almost 2 per cent, but its aggregate external deficit increases slightly. That is largely due to the fairly 
strong in-region growth; the Asian deficit region’s current account relative to GDP worsens by half a 
percentage point, outweighing the Asian surplus region’s reduction. Income inequality—as measured by 
the functional distribution of income—decreases.19 Increases of the wage share should be interpreted 
carefully. Principally, wage share changes in this model are cyclical, and it is not obvious that they will 
last. However, if higher real wages become structurally embedded, they can translate into 
improvements in the personal distribution of income, even if productivity growth catches up. Fiscal 
balances across Asia remain sound. In summary, strengthening social safety nets represents an 
additional route for Asian economies to reduce dependence on exports, to deepen domestic markets, 
and to contribute to sustainable recovery from the Great Recession. 
A coordinated scenario: Pro-labor policies in surplus countries  
Europe is only the most recent pinball of global financial turmoil that began in 2008. The Great 
Recession has strained previously sound fiscal balances, for example in Spain, and has exposed less 
sound fiscal balances in Greece. The contention that these countries can liquidate themselves back to 
health appears to be always briefly popular with investors, until it is remembered that fiscal restraint is 
contractionary, and very well can increase the ratio of public deficit to GDP. The vacuous but excited 
debate about these issues takes the light from where it should be shone: The fact that “common” 
monetary policy is made in the spirit of and for Germany, and no common fiscal policy exists. The 
practical question is what Europe can do about its internal imbalances, aside from various “lifeline” 
stability funds.  
The answer to this question must be a political one; the model certainly cannot answer such 
questions. It can, however, point towards the principal changes necessary for internal rebalancing. As on 
a global level, rebalancing requires expenditure shifts and the corresponding price changes. Within the 
Eurozone, nominal exchange rate changes cannot help; the burden of adjustment falls on wages, and 
nominal wage increases in Eurozone surplus countries are one possible way to go. Further fiscal 
expansion is another.  
In this scenario, we increase nominal wages and real government expenditures in Eurozone surplus 
countries by ten per cent, in addition to the social and pro-labor policies applied in the previous 
(Rebalancing Asia) scenario. The results are clearly expansionary and reduce global imbalances. The 
chain of causation begins with increased domestic demand in surplus countries. Income and 
consumption growth in Eurozone and Asian surplus countries reduces global imbalances through the 
reduction of their surplusses. Imports increase through the income channel, and exports decrease 
                                                          
19
 In the result tables, the proportional change of the labor share of income is equal to the difference between real wage 
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through the relative price channel. Crucially, the results show a global improvement in the functional 
distribution of income.  This scenario highlights that rebalancing does not have to be—indeed, should 
not be—driven by contraction and deflation, but rather by a set of coordinated policies in surplus 
countries that reduce inequality and foster domestic demand.  
5. Conclusions 
What can be concluded based on these thought experiments? Policy makers around the world have 
at their disposal the tools to sustain a healthy global recovery as well as a reduction of global 
imbalances. In all regions, a crucial issue might be to think outside of the respective regional orthodoxy. 
Broad application of a variety of policies—including increased social spending, wage policies, and well 
targeted transfers—might replace the received wisdom of targeting inflation and letting “the markets” 
figure out the rest. Importantly, none of the examples laid out here lead to exploding government 
borrowing. To be sure, the model is ill-suited to address the issue of debt sustainability, but surely 
highlights the fact that pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies do not aid recovery and rebalancing.  
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7. Tables and figures 
 
                        
  GDP  Shares   u S-I T-G E-M S/Y T/Y E/Y E/W 
                        
World  60404     6.2 3.4 -3.4 -2.6 24.0 17.3 22.0   
                        
Developed  39909 66.1   6.1 1.9 -3.8 -1.9 18.8 19.0 18.2 54.6 
  US 14395 23.8 36.1 5.7 1.4 -6.6 -5.2 13.7 16.0 9.1 9.9 
  Europe 18963 31.4 47.5 6.9 1.5 -2.4 -0.9 20.9 20.9 25.0 35.6 
  Japan 5057 8.4 12.7 3.9 5.6 -2.6 3.1 25.4 18.5 15.3 5.8 
  Canada 1494 2.5 3.7 5.9 -1.5 2.0 0.5 19.3 24.5 30.4 3.4 
                        
Developing 17490 29.0   6.4 3.6 -1.8 1.8 32.4 14.8 26.0 34.2 
  Developing, excl. BRICS 8009 13.3 45.8 6.7 1.5 -3.0 -1.6 25.7 11.8 29.3 17.6 
    Asia 5105 8.5 29.2 6.2 2.6 -3.8 -1.2 28.0 11.5 32.9 12.6 
    Latin America  2308 3.8 13.2 5.2 -0.8 -0.9 -1.7 22.5 12.7 23.8 4.1 
    Africa  597 1.0 3.4 16.3 0.2 -4.5 -4.2 20.7 10.7 20.5 0.9 
  BRICS  9481 15.7 54.2 6.1 5.4 -0.8 4.6 38.0 17.3 23.3 16.6 
    Brazil 1571 2.6 9.0 8.1 1.1 -2.8 -1.7 19.1 19.4 14.2 1.7 
    Russia 1614 2.7 9.2 6.3 1.6 4.1 5.7 24.1 25.5 29.2 3.5 
    India 1281 2.1 7.3 7.3 3.6 -5.8 -2.3 37.1 9.6 17.1 1.6 
    China 4749 7.9 27.2 4.2 9.4 -0.4 9.0 50.6 15.6 25.3 9.0 
    South Africa 266 0.4 1.5 21.4 -7.1 -1.1 -8.2 12.8 23.9 33.5 0.7 
                        
Energy exporters 3006 5.0   6.8 22.2 -7.5 14.7 45.0 9.7 49.3 11.1 
                        
                        
AFR: Africa  597 1.0   16.3 0.2 -4.5 -4.2 20.7 10.7 20.5 0.9 
AD: Asia (D) 2729 4.5   8.0 0.1 -4.2 -4.0 23.9 11.7 29.6 6.1 
AS: Asia (S) 2375 3.9   4.3 5.5 -3.4 2.1 32.2 11.4 36.6 6.5 
BRICS1: Brazil 1571 2.6   8.1 1.1 -2.8 -1.7 19.1 19.4 14.2 1.7 
BRICS2: Russia 1614 2.7   6.3 1.6 4.1 5.7 24.1 25.5 29.2 3.5 
BRICS3: India 1281 2.1   7.3 3.6 -5.8 -2.3 37.1 9.6 17.1 1.6 
BRICS4: China 4749 7.9   4.2 9.4 -0.4 9.0 50.6 15.6 25.3 9.0 
BRICS5: South Africa 266 0.4   21.4 -7.1 -1.1 -8.2 12.8 23.9 33.5 0.7 
CAN: Canada 1494 2.5   5.9 -1.5 2.0 0.5 19.3 24.5 30.4 3.4 
EN: Energy  3006 5.0   6.8 22.2 -7.5 14.7 45.0 9.7 49.3 11.1 
EUR: Europe 5578 9.2   5.7 -0.2 -3.0 -3.2 18.2 20.8 24.1 10.1 
EZD: Eurozone (D) 7851 13.0   8.2 -1.6 -3.6 -5.2 19.6 20.8 18.1 10.7 
EZS: Eurozone (S) 5534 9.2   6.3 7.5 0.0 7.4 25.4 21.3 35.6 14.8 
JAP: Japan 5057 8.4   3.9 5.6 -2.6 3.1 25.4 18.5 15.3 5.8 
LAC: Latin America 2308 3.8   5.2 -0.8 -0.9 -1.7 22.5 12.7 23.8 4.1 
US: United States 14395 23.8   5.7 1.4 -6.6 -5.2 13.7 16.0 9.1 9.9 
                        
Table 1: Macroeconomic data (National accounts, unemployment, related shares) 
The table reports GDP and related shares, unemployment rate and ratios of private, public and external balance, private savings, taxes and 
exports to GDP, as well as the share of exports in world exports. Values are in billions of 2008 USD. Rates are in percentage points. The upper 
part shows a regional aggregation that corresponds to reported simulation results. The lower part shows the same data for the sixteen 
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1   7 3 3 2 5 4 3 1 16 8 39 11 3 8 11 
2 7   112 12 29 15 123 4 13 101 60 78 57 45 33 118 
3 8 139   13 12 34 109 9 14 69 51 51 64 126 23 147 
4 3 8 8   7 1 25 2 3 29 10 22 21 8 44 32 
5 3 47 10 5   3 20 0 2 38 126 78 97 11 3 28 
6 6 24 25 5 2   17 3 2 54 13 20 11 4 4 27 
7 15 140 108 22 47 28   10 23 116 84 97 116 99 47 252 
8 7 5 4 1 1 4 8   1 6 11 11 10 8 1 10 
9 1 9 9 5 2 2 11 1   13 14 12 9 11 16 339 
10 19 165 99 30 14 81 115 25 29   103 228 118 155 34 272 
11 13 64 56 16 90 20 26 10 24 123   334 417 18 19 113 
12 36 67 52 22 50 14 34 9 17 146 352   450 20 36 117 
13 14 67 63 24 72 13 60 17 21 130 560 699   27 36 168 
14 4 86 146 11 27 6 127 6 17 54 32 38 44   30 143 
15 2 13 10 43 5 4 29 2 29 36 16 36 30 14   280 
16 9 76 115 39 20 17 69 9 249 109 83 93 104 67 254   
                                  
17 123 807 870 223 472 219 1203 89 453 1484 1344 1425 1972 772 549 1313 
18 148 917 821 250 379 248 776 111 446 1040 1523 1835 1561 616 588 2058 
19 -25 -110 49 -27 93 -29 426 -22 8 444 -180 -411 411 156 -39 -745 
                                  
                                  
1   0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 
2 1.0   3.5 0.7 1.5 1.0 2.2 1.1 0.7 2.5 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.7 
3 1.0 3.8   0.7 0.6 2.2 2.0 2.3 0.7 1.7 0.7 0.5 0.9 2.2 0.8 0.9 
4 0.3 0.2 0.3   0.3 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.2 
5 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.3   0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.8 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 
6 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.1   0.3 0.8 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
7 2.0 3.8 3.4 1.2 2.4 1.8   2.6 1.2 2.9 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 
8 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1   0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
9 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3   0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 2.1 
10 2.5 4.5 3.1 1.6 0.7 5.3 2.1 6.6 1.5   1.4 2.3 1.7 2.7 1.2 1.7 
11 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.9 4.5 1.3 0.5 2.7 1.2 3.0   3.4 5.9 0.3 0.7 0.7 
12 4.9 1.8 1.6 1.2 2.5 0.9 0.6 2.4 0.9 3.6 5.0   6.3 0.4 1.2 0.7 
13 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.3 3.6 0.9 1.1 4.6 1.1 3.2 7.9 7.2   0.5 1.2 1.0 
14 0.5 2.4 4.6 0.6 1.3 0.4 2.3 1.7 0.9 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.6   1.0 0.9 
15 0.3 0.4 0.3 2.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2   1.7 
16 1.2 2.1 3.6 2.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.4 12.9 2.7 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.2 8.8   
                                  
  19.9 25.2 25.7 13.7 19.0 16.2 14.0 29.5 23.1 25.7 21.5 18.9 22.0 10.9 20.3 12.5 
                                  
Table 2: Bilateral trade matrix  
The upper part of this table reports 2008 trade volumes in billions of current US dollars in the base year model data set. (D) and (S) in the top 
row stand for the Deficit and Surplus region, respectively. Row 17 sums total country and region exports (across rows), row 18 sums total 
imports (along columns). Row 19 is the difference, the current account. In the lower part, each cell shows (in percentage points) the ratio of the 
corresponding cell in the upper part to regional total imports. The column sum of the lower part of the table reports the aggregate import share 
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 Source Period     Price 
Elast. 
GDP 
Elast.   
       
    
   1 AFR Egypt 29% 66% 0.15 2.25 LL, R 1990-2009 1 AFR -0.31 2.26 
2 AFR Morocco 15% 34% -1.2 2.29 LL, R 1990-2008 2 AD -0.27 0.79 
3 AD S. Korea 34% 45% -0.28 0.36 1st, P 1990-2009 3 AS -0.63 1.61 
4 AD Turkey 27% 36% -0.11 1.16 LL, P 1990-2009 4 BR1 -0.82 1.91 
5 AD Israel 7% 9% -0.24 0.92 LL, R 1990-2010 5 BR2 -0.50 1.50 
6 AD Pakistan 7% 9% -0.87 1.45 1st, R 1990-2010 6 BR3 -0.74 1.47 
7 AS Australia 42% 53% -0.90 1.91 KALY 1984-2003 7 BR4 -0.35 2.53 
8 AS Indonesia 20% 25% -0.20 1.21 1st, R 1997-2009 8 BR5 -0.91 2.20 
9 AS Malaysia 9% 11% -0.57 1.46 1st, R 1991-2010 9 CAN -0.35 2.85 
10 AS Hong Kong 9% 11% -0.36 1.24 1st, P 1990-2010 10 EN -0.51 1.61 
11 BR1 Brazil 100% 100% -0.82 1.91 1st, P 1995-2009 11 EUR -0.29 1.62 
12 BR2 Russia 100% 100% -0.50 1.50 Ivanova 1995-2005 12 EZD -1.02 2.89 
13 BR3 India 100% 100% -0.74 1.47 KALY 1984-2003 13 EZS -0.85 1.63 
14 BR4 China 100% 100% -0.35 2.53 1st, R 1990-2009 14 JAP -0.28 1.65 
15 BR5 South Africa 100% 100% -0.91 2.20 LL, P 1990-2006 15 LAC -0.38 2.11 
16 CAN Canada 100% 100% -0.35 2.85 1st, P 1990-2009 16 US -0.25 2.11 
17 EUR UK 47% 75% -0.27 1.90 LL, P 1990-2009     
18 EUR Switzerland 9% 15% -0.43 0.73 1st, R 1990-2010 
    19 EUR Denmark 6% 10% -0.23 0.84 1st, R 1990-2010 
    20 EZD France 35% 39% -1.18 3.26 1st, R 1990-2009   
21 EZD Italy 29% 32% -0.92 2.60 KALY 1984-2003     
22 EZD Spain 20% 22% -0.93 2.71 KALY 1984-2003 
    23 EZD Belgium 6% 7% -0.84 2.66 KALY 1990-2010 
    24 EZS Germany 66% 74% -0.92 1.48 KALY 1984-2003   
25 EZS Netherlands 16% 18% -0.68 2.56 1st, P 1990-2010 
    26 EZS Austria 7% 8% -0.60 .92 1st, P 1990-2010 
    27 EN Norway 14% 58% -0.46 1.25 1st, P 1990-2010 
    28 EN Venezuela 10% 42% -0.57 2.1 1st, R 1990-2008 
    29 JAP Japan 100% 100% -0.28 1.65 1st, P 1990-2009 
    30 LAC Argentina 14% 18% -0.51 1.24 1st, R 1993-2009 
    31 LAC Bolivia 1% 1% -0.07 0.55 1st, R 1995-2009 
    32 LAC Mexico 46% 58% -0.31 2.31 LL, P 1990-2009 
    33 LAC Columbia 11% 14% -0.55 2.12 1st, R 1994-2010 
    34 LAC Chile 7% 9% -0.38 2.72 LL, R 1996-2010 
    35 US US 100% 100% -0.25 2.11 LL, P 1990-2009 
      
        
    
Table 4: Import elasticities 
The table reports price and income elasticities of import demand for selected countries. See Table 2 or the appendix for abbreviations of 
regions. Trade elasticities are not based on bilateral trade data, but reflect each country’s aggregate real import time series. Bilateral trade 
elasticities were not estimated due to data limitations and the scope of such an estimation. “GDP weight” is the in-region weight of the country. 
“Calc. weight” is the weight with which the reported elasticties enter the averaged regional elasticities in the right part of the table. For all 
regions except Africa and Energy Exporters, the countries entering the calculation represent at least 50% of composite GDP. In the column on 
sources, KALY represents elasticities taken from Kwack et. al. (2007, and Ivanova represents elasticities taken from Ivanova (2007).  All other 
elasticities are based on own calculation. “LL” indicates a log-linear regression, “1st” a first-differenced model; “R” data based on IMF/IFS real 
exchange rate indexes, and “P” data based on the ratio of a domestic CPI and import prices, as well from IMF/IFS.  The most robust results were 
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Weight Wage share Source 
Data 
Year     Wage share 
  
      
    
  1 AFR Egypt 27% 66% 73.7 ILO 2005 1 AFR 69.02 
2 AFR Morocco 14% 34% 60.0 
 
  2 AD 64.16 
3 AD S. Korea 34% 56% 77.0 ILO 2006 3 AS 60.50 
4 AD Turkey 27% 44% 48.0 EU 2008 4 BR1 60.00 
5 AS Australia 42% 68% 60.7 EU 2008 5 BR2 44.80 
6 AS Indonesia 20% 32% 60.0 
 
  6 BR3 82.00 
7 BR1 Brazil 100% 100% 60.0 
 
2005 7 BR4 61.70 
8 BR2 Russia 100% 100% 44.8 Vasiliouk 2007 8 BR5 50.40 
9 BR3 India 100% 100% 82.0 Rada 2000 9 CAN 60.80 
10 BR4 China 100% 100% 61.7 Rada 2000 10 EN 60.00 
11 BR5 South Africa 100% 100% 50.4 ILO 2004 11 EUR 67.17 
12 CAN Canada 100% 100% 60.8 ILO 2006 12 EZD 63.77 
13 EUR UK 47% 
 
68.5 EU 2006 13 EZS 62.55 
14 EUR EU27 
  
64.5 EU 2008 14 JAP 57.70 
15 EZD France 35% 
 
65.3 EU 2008 15 LAC 49.80 
16 EZD Italy 29% 
 
62.9 EU 2008 16 US 65.70 
17 EZS Germany 66% 
 
62.2 EU 2008 
   18 JAP Japan 100% 100% 57.7 ILO 2007 
   19 LAC Argentina 14% 23% 60.0 
 
2005 
   20 LAC Mexico 46% 77% 46.7 ILO 2004 
   21 US US 100% 100% 65.7 ILO 2006 
                      
Table 5: Wage shares  
The left part of the table reports wage shares for selected countries, their sources and data years. See Table 2 or the appendix for abbreviations 
of regions. “GDP weight” is the in-region weight of the country. “Calc. weight” is the weight with which the reported wage share enters the 
averaged regional wage share in the right part of the table. For the European countries, the Ameco database provides wage shares for (almost) 
all countries, so that exact weights were used. See the appendix for more details on data sources.  
 
 Scenario 1: US Scenario 2: Revaluation Scenario 3: Asia Scenario 4: Coordination 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
                                  
  GDP  Δu Δca Δsg GDP  Δu Δca Δsg GDP  Δu Δca Δsg GDP  Δu Δca Δsg 
                                  
World  -1.9 1.1 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.0 -0.6 0.1 0.0 1.6 -0.9 0.2 0.0 
                                  
Developed  -2.4 1.4 0.3 0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.1 1.2 -0.6 0.1 0.0 
  US -5.5 3.1 1.4 2.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.1 
  Europe -0.7 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.1 1.6 -0.9 -0.1 -0.3 
  Japan -0.9 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.3 -0.7 0.4 0.2 1.6 -0.9 0.5 0.3 
  Canada -1.5 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
                                  
Developing -0.7 0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 2.0 -1.2 -0.5 -0.2 2.5 -1.5 -0.4 -0.1 
  Developing, ex BRICS -1.5 0.9 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.7 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 2.2 -1.3 0.0 0.0 
    Asia -1.5 0.9 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 2.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.1 3.1 -1.7 -0.1 0.0 
    Latin America  -1.7 1.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 -0.4 0.2 0.1 
    Africa  -0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.1 
  BRICS  -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 -1.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 2.3 -1.4 -0.9 -0.3 2.8 -1.6 -0.7 -0.2 
    Brazil -0.8 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.7 -0.4 0.2 0.1 1.0 -0.6 0.4 0.2 
    Russia -0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.7 -0.4 0.2 0.1 1.7 -1.0 0.6 0.3 
    India -0.5 0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.8 -0.5 0.4 0.1 1.2 -0.6 0.5 0.1 
    China 0.5 -0.3 -1.2 0.0 -2.1 1.2 0.2 0.0 3.9 -2.2 -2.3 -0.7 4.2 -2.4 -2.2 -0.7 
    South Africa -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.1 1.2 -0.6 0.3 0.2 
                                  
Energy exporters -1.4 0.8 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 1.1 -0.6 0.4 0.2 1.7 -1.0 0.6 0.3 
                                  
Table 6: Scenario – Overview  
All entries are in percentage points. The columns report growth rates of GDP, the change in the unemployment rate, the change of the ratio of 
current account relative to GDP and the change of the ratio of government saving to GDP for four scenarios. Note that CA/Y for the World is the 
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  GDP  w/Q Y/L P RER u   CA/Y   SG/Y   E/W   
                            
World  -1.88 -0.84 -0.76 -0.66   7.26 6.19 -2.41 -2.63 -3.02 -3.38     
                            
Developed  -2.43 -1.69 -0.99 -0.30 -0.33 7.45 6.06 -1.56 -1.91 -3.13 -3.76 54.9 54.6 
  US -5.46 -3.87 -2.22 -0.45 -0.22 8.81 5.69 -3.82 -5.18 -4.60 -6.55 9.9 9.9 
  Europe -0.72 -0.44 -0.29 -0.21 -0.28 7.34 6.93 -1.20 -0.94 -2.56 -2.41 36.0 35.6 
  Japan -0.93 -0.53 -0.37 -0.29 -0.75 4.39 3.86 2.75 3.07 -2.73 -2.55 5.8 5.8 
  Canada -1.50 -1.38 -0.60 0.03 -0.61 6.70 5.86 0.02 0.53 1.70 2.00 3.2 3.4 
                            
Developing -0.73 0.96 -0.29 -1.45 0.82 6.79 6.38 1.11 1.81 -1.95 -1.81 34.0 34.2 
  Developing, excl. BRICS -1.51 -0.96 -0.61 -0.38 -0.45 7.60 6.74 -2.05 -1.55 -3.22 -3.02 17.5 17.6 
    Asia -1.53 -1.12 -0.61 -0.30 -0.63 7.05 6.19 -1.66 -1.19 -4.01 -3.80 12.7 12.6 
    Latin America  -1.74 -1.01 -0.70 -0.42 -0.24 6.17 5.18 -2.27 -1.67 -1.15 -0.92 4.0 4.1 
    Africa  -0.39 0.77 -0.15 -1.00 0.38 16.50 16.31 -2.05 -1.55 -4.51 -4.45 0.9 0.9 
  BRICS  -0.08 2.56 -0.03 -2.35 1.87 6.12 6.09 3.81 4.65 -0.87 -0.79 16.4 16.6 
    Brazil -0.77 -0.13 -0.31 -0.51 -0.28 8.54 8.11 -2.02 -1.71 -2.97 -2.81 1.7 1.7 
    Russia -0.80 -0.37 -0.32 -0.35 -0.24 6.71 6.26 5.42 5.73 3.97 4.12 3.6 3.5 
    India -0.53 0.35 -0.21 -0.79 -0.05 7.57 7.27 -2.67 -2.27 -5.92 -5.84 1.6 1.6 
    China 0.53 5.17 0.21 -4.14 3.92 3.89 4.19 7.74 8.98 -0.42 -0.40 8.8 9.0 
    South Africa -0.63 -0.34 -0.25 -0.34 -0.43 21.66 21.36 -8.41 -8.21 -1.25 -1.14 0.7 0.7 
                            
Energy exporters -1.37 -0.27 -0.55 -0.79 0.11 7.53 6.76 14.15 14.76 -7.72 -7.48 11.1 11.1 
                            
Table 7: Scenario – Reduction of public deficit in US  
All entries are in percentage points. The columns report growth rates of GDP, the real wage, labor productivity, prices and the real effective 
exchange rate; as well as the unemployment rate, the current account relative to GDP, government saving relative to GDP, the share of 
country/region exports in world exports, and the respective base year (by) shares. Note that CA/Y for the World is the cumulative current 
account of all deficit regions.  
 
                            
  GDP  w/Q Y/L P RER u   CA/Y   SG/Y   E/W   
                            
World  -0.24 -0.17 -0.10 0.11   6.33 6.19 -2.69 -2.63 -3.41 -3.38     
                            
Developed  -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.27 1.43 6.10 6.06 -2.04 -1.91 -3.83 -3.76 54.2 54.6 
  US -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 0.27 1.82 5.82 5.69 -5.36 -5.18 -6.67 -6.55 9.8 9.9 
  Europe 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.27 0.80 6.90 6.93 -1.02 -0.94 -2.46 -2.41 35.3 35.6 
  Japan -0.18 -0.12 -0.07 0.31 2.95 3.96 3.86 2.87 3.07 -2.66 -2.55 5.8 5.8 
  Canada -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.26 0.71 5.88 5.86 0.40 0.53 1.94 2.00 3.4 3.4 
                            
Developing -0.66 -0.45 -0.26 -0.34 -2.52 6.77 6.38 2.05 1.81 -1.80 -1.81 34.7 34.2 
  Developing, excl. BRICS -0.22 -0.13 -0.09 0.52 1.84 6.85 6.74 -1.84 -1.55 -3.13 -3.02 17.5 17.6 
    Asia -0.25 -0.17 -0.10 0.64 2.17 6.33 6.19 -1.55 -1.19 -3.95 -3.80 12.5 12.6 
    Latin America  -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 0.30 1.20 5.25 5.18 -1.83 -1.67 -0.98 -0.92 4.1 4.1 
    Africa  -0.10 0.08 -0.04 0.26 1.37 16.36 16.31 -1.84 -1.55 -4.52 -4.45 0.9 0.9 
  BRICS  -1.03 -0.72 -0.42 -1.07 -6.23 6.71 6.09 5.07 4.65 -0.77 -0.79 17.2 16.6 
    Brazil 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.27 1.75 8.07 8.11 -1.76 -1.71 -2.84 -2.81 1.7 1.7 
    Russia -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.42 1.30 6.28 6.26 5.52 5.73 4.02 4.12 3.5 3.5 
    India 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.40 1.68 7.23 7.27 -2.38 -2.27 -5.88 -5.84 1.6 1.6 
    China -2.13 -1.44 -0.86 -2.54 -14.1 5.42 4.19 9.22 8.98 -0.37 -0.40 9.7 9.0 
    South Africa 0.34 0.18 0.14 0.56 1.29 21.20 21.36 -8.27 -8.21 -1.17 -1.14 0.7 0.7 
                            
Energy exporters -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.53 1.40 6.77 6.76 14.55 14.76 -7.58 -7.48 11.1 11.1 
                            
Table 8: Scenario – Revaluation of CNY against USD 
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  GDP  w/Q Y/L P RER u   CA/Y   SG/Y   E/W   
                            
World  1.01 1.18 0.40 0.88   5.61 6.19 -2.50 -2.63 -3.35 -3.38     
                            
Developed  0.55 0.34 0.22 0.24 0.81 5.74 6.06 -1.75 -1.91 -3.67 -3.76 54.3 54.6 
  US 0.34 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.98 5.50 5.69 -5.12 -5.18 -6.51 -6.55 9.8 9.9 
  Europe 0.54 0.32 0.21 0.24 0.47 6.63 6.93 -0.77 -0.94 -2.32 -2.41 35.1 35.6 
  Japan 1.25 0.82 0.50 0.36 1.74 3.13 3.86 3.46 3.07 -2.34 -2.55 5.9 5.8 
  Canada 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.44 5.73 5.86 0.55 0.53 2.02 2.00 3.4 3.4 
                            
Developing 2.05 3.21 0.81 2.35 -1.16 5.21 6.38 1.29 1.81 -1.99 -1.81 34.6 34.2 
  Developing, excl. BRICS 1.69 2.32 0.67 1.81 -0.54 5.78 6.74 -1.67 -1.55 -3.07 -3.02 17.9 17.6 
    Asia 2.42 3.73 0.96 2.75 -1.24 4.84 6.19 -1.45 -1.19 -3.86 -3.80 12.9 12.6 
    Latin America  0.46 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.52 4.92 5.18 -1.56 -1.67 -0.88 -0.92 4.1 4.1 
    Africa  0.30 -0.33 0.12 0.66 0.25 16.16 16.31 -1.67 -1.55 -4.42 -4.45 0.9 0.9 
  BRICS  2.35 3.96 0.93 2.81 -1.68 4.73 6.09 3.76 4.65 -1.09 -0.79 16.7 16.6 
    Brazil 0.68 0.14 0.27 0.47 0.59 7.74 8.11 -1.46 -1.71 -2.67 -2.81 1.7 1.7 
    Russia 0.75 0.46 0.30 0.30 0.56 5.84 6.26 5.97 5.73 4.24 4.12 3.5 3.5 
    India 0.84 0.18 0.33 0.65 0.87 6.81 7.27 -1.91 -2.27 -5.74 -5.84 1.7 1.6 
    China 3.89 7.51 1.54 5.08 -3.95 1.97 4.19 6.67 8.98 -1.12 -0.40 9.2 9.0 
    South Africa 0.71 0.39 0.29 0.46 0.68 21.03 21.36 -8.03 -8.21 -1.03 -1.14 0.7 0.7 
                            
Energy exporters 1.12 0.24 0.45 0.77 0.35 6.13 6.76 15.20 14.76 -7.32 -7.48 11.2 11.1 
                            
Table 9: Scenario – Rebalancing Asia  
See notes for Table 7.  
 
                            
  GDP  w/Q Y/L P RER u   CA/Y   SG/Y   E/W   
                            
World  1.58 2.03 0.63 1.43   5.29 6.19 -2.42 -2.63 -3.41 -3.38     
                            
Developed  1.15 1.50 0.46 0.96 0.91 5.41 6.06 -1.83 -1.91 -3.80 -3.76 54.5 54.6 
  US 0.54 0.34 0.21 0.29 1.39 5.39 5.69 -5.08 -5.18 -6.48 -6.55 9.8 9.9 
  Europe 1.55 2.59 0.62 1.67 0.26 6.06 6.93 -1.02 -0.94 -2.66 -2.41 35.5 35.6 
  Japan 1.59 1.04 0.63 0.45 2.05 2.94 3.86 3.57 3.07 -2.27 -2.55 5.9 5.8 
  Canada 0.35 0.31 0.14 0.20 0.64 5.66 5.86 0.56 0.53 2.03 2.00 3.3 3.4 
                            
Developing 2.54 3.51 1.01 2.53 -0.80 4.93 6.38 1.45 1.81 -1.92 -1.81 34.4 34.2 
  Developing, excl. BRICS 2.23 2.69 0.88 1.97 -0.24 5.48 6.74 -1.53 -1.55 -3.01 -3.02 17.8 17.6 
    Asia 3.09 4.25 1.23 2.89 -0.90 4.46 6.19 -1.27 -1.19 -3.78 -3.80 12.8 12.6 
    Latin America  0.72 0.41 0.29 0.38 0.79 4.77 5.18 -1.49 -1.67 -0.85 -0.92 4.0 4.1 
    Africa  0.57 -0.66 0.23 1.23 0.33 16.02 16.31 -1.53 -1.55 -4.38 -4.45 0.9 0.9 
  BRICS  2.80 4.21 1.11 3.00 -1.27 4.47 6.09 3.93 4.65 -1.02 -0.79 16.6 16.6 
    Brazil 1.03 0.21 0.41 0.73 0.91 7.54 8.11 -1.33 -1.71 -2.61 -2.81 1.7 1.7 
    Russia 1.70 1.06 0.68 0.59 1.27 5.30 6.26 6.29 5.73 4.41 4.12 3.5 3.5 
    India 1.16 0.26 0.46 0.88 1.10 6.63 7.27 -1.76 -2.27 -5.70 -5.84 1.6 1.6 
    China 4.25 7.76 1.68 5.20 -3.55 1.77 4.19 6.81 8.98 -1.07 -0.40 9.1 9.0 
    South Africa 1.19 0.64 0.47 0.79 1.11 20.80 21.36 -7.92 -8.21 -0.97 -1.14 0.7 0.7 
                            
Energy exporters 1.71 0.36 0.68 1.20 0.50 5.80 6.76 15.41 14.76 -7.23 -7.48 11.1 11.1 
                            
Table 10: Scenario – Coordination 
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis for model responses to a US investment shock 
This figure reports sensitivity analysis. For the top two panels, the horizontal axis shows employment rate elasticities    drawn from a uniform 
probability distribution with bounds 0.25 and 1.25. For the middle two panels, the horizontal axis shows the ratio of class savings propensities, 
     , drawn from a uniform probability distribution with bounds 0.2 and 0.8. For the lower two panels, the horizontal axis shows the US 
import price elasticity, drawn from a uniform probability distribution with bounds 0 and 1. The vertical axes show world GDP growth and the 
change in the ratio of cumulative world current account imbalance relative to GDP following an increase in US real investment that represents 
one per cent of US GDP. The vertical axes show percentage points.  
8. Appendix 
Regional aggregation: The model disaggregates the global economy into sixteen regions and countries. Some groups 
clearly contain fairly heterogenous countries. For example, Norway and Saudi Arabia are members of the energy exporting bloc. 
On the other hand, Germany and Greece, despite sharing the same currency, are featured in separate blocs. Similarly, the 
‘BRICS’ – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – are considered individually, rather than subsumed in their geographical 
regional aggregates. Hence, the aggregation strategy generally places emphasis on the countries that have in recent years and 
throughout the current crisis featured prominently in the public debate. Below follows a complete list of countries covered in 
each region. In each region, the countries are sorted by the share of regional aggregate GDP, shown in parentheses. Note that a 
value of zero per cent indicates a value below one per cent; percentages do not add to 100 per cent due to rounding.  
 
AFR – Africa: EGYPT (27%), MOROCCO (14%), TUNISIA (7%), KENYA (5%), ETHIOPIA (4%), COTE D IVOIRE (4%), TANZANIA 
(3%), GHANA (3%), UGANDA (3%), ZAMBIA (2%), SENEGAL (2%), CONGO, DEM. REP. OF (2%), MOZAMBIQUE (2%), MAURITIUS 
(2%), MADAGASCAR (2%), MALI (1%), CHAD (1%), BURKINA FASO (1%), BENIN (1%), NIGER (1%), GUINEA (1%), RWANDA (1%), 
MALAWI (1%), ZIMBABWE (1%), MAURITANIA (1%), TOGO (0%), SOMALIA (0%), SIERRA LEONE (0%), CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 
(0%), CAPE VERDE (0%); AD – Asia (Deficit countries): KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (34%), TURKEY (27%), ISRAEL (7%), PAKISTAN (7%), 
PHILIPPINES (6%), NEW ZEALAND (5%), VIETNAM (3%), BANGLADESH (3%), SRI LANKA (2%), MYANMAR (1%), LEBANON (1%), 
JORDAN (1%), AFGHANISTAN, I.R. OF (0%), NEPAL (0%), GEORGIA (0%), ARMENIA (0%), CAMBODIA (0%), NEW CALEDONIA (0%), 
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INDONESIA (20%), THAILAND (11%), MALAYSIA (9%), CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG (9%), SINGAPORE (7%), UZBEKISTAN (1%), 
CHINA,P.R.:MACAO (1%), PAPUA NEW GUINEA (0%); BRICS1 – Brazil; BRICS2 – Russia; BRICS3 – India; BRICS4 – China; BRICS5 – 
South Africa; CAN – Canada; EN – Energy exporters: SAUDI ARABIA (14%), NORWAY (14%), IRAN, I.R. OF (11%), VENEZUELA, 
REP. BOL. (10%), UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (9%), NIGERIA (7%), ALGERIA (5%), KUWAIT (5%), KAZAKHSTAN (4%), QATAR (3%), 
LIBYA (3%), SUDAN (2%), SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (2%), OMAN (2%), ECUADOR (2%), AZERBAIJAN, REP. OF (1%), ANGOLA (1%), 
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF (1%), TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (1%), IRAQ (1%), CAMEROON (1%), BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF (1%), 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA (1%), GABON (0%), BRUNEI DARUSSALAM (0%), CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (0%), TURKMENISTAN (0%), LAO 
PEOPLE S DEM.REP (0%), NETHERLANDS ANTILLES (0%); EUR – Europe (Rest of): UNITED KINGDOM (47%), POLAND (9%), 
SWITZERLAND (9%), SWEDEN (8%), DENMARK (6%), CZECH REPUBLIC (4%), ROMANIA (4%), UKRAINE (3%), HUNGARY (3%), 
CROATIA (1%), BELARUS (1%), SERBIA, REPUBLIC OF (1%), BULGARIA (1%), LITHUANIA (1%), LATVIA (1%), ESTONIA (0%), BOSNIA 
& HERZEGOVINA (0%), ICELAND (0%), ALBANIA (0%), MACEDONIA, FYR (0%), MOLDOVA (0%), MONTENEGRO, REP. OF (0%); 
EZD – Eurozone (Deficit countries): FRANCE (35%), ITALY (29%), SPAIN (20%), BELGIUM (6%), GREECE (4%), PORTUGAL (3%), 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC (1%), SLOVENIA (1%), CYPRUS (0%), MALTA (0%); EZS – Eurozone (Surplus countries): GERMANY (66%), 
NETHERLANDS (16%), AUSTRIA (7%), FINLAND (5%), IRELAND (5%), LUXEMBOURG (1%); JAP – Japan; LAC – Latin America and 
Carribean: MEXICO (46%), ARGENTINA (14%), COLOMBIA (10%), CHILE (7%), PERU (6%), CUBA (3%), DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
(2%), GUATEMALA (2%), URUGUAY (1%), COSTA RICA (1%), EL SALVADOR (1%), PANAMA (1%), BOLIVIA (1%), PARAGUAY (1%), 
JAMAICA (1%), HONDURAS (1%), HAITI (0%), BAHAMAS, THE (0%), NICARAGUA (0%), BERMUDA (0%), BARBADOS (0%), 
SURINAME (0%), ARUBA (0%), GREENLAND (0%); US – United States  
 
GDP by Expenditure: UN SNA http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp: National accounts at the UN provide 
data on GDP in current USD by expenditure (G, C, I+Inventories, Ex, Im). The latest data is 2008. Data is provided on an annual 
basis only.  
 
Government: Data on government expenditures is from the UN SNA overview of GDP by expenditure. Government 
revenues are from UN SNA Table 4.5 or, if unavailable there, Table 2.1. Taxes are net of transfers. More detail follows: The data 
on government expenditure in UN SNA GDP by expenditure excludes public investment. Since changes in the fiscal stance 
should be reflected in the government’s balance, public investment has been subtracted from aggregate investment, and 
subsequently added to government consumption expenditures. Gross government investment, which is net of inventory 
changes, was collected from SNA Table 4.5, General Government (S.13). This data was used to adjust aggregate investment 
data to exclude government investment, and to increase government expenditure by the same amount. The data was available 
for 72 countries in the data base, accounting for 88.5% of the GDP in the 160 country data set. On government revenues, UN 
SNA Table 4.1 contains the most complete set of SNA accounts for 106 countries, and thus is the first choice for tax data 
collection. UN SNA Table 2.1 contains a subset of the total tax data, and is used only if the tax data is not available in Table 4.1. 
Since the 2008 data set is very incomplete, the methodology for estimating 2008 taxes from the SNA database for all estimated 
countries is to multiply the ratio of data-year taxes to data-year GDP, and multiply that by 2008 GDP. The total tax for the data 
year is accumulated from the following detailed fields:  
Plus Taxes on production and imports – SNA 93 Item Code D.2 - Uses 
Minus Subsidies on production and imports – SNA 93 Item Code D.3 - Uses 
Plus Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. – SNA 93 Item Code D.5 – Uses 
Plus Social contributions – SNA 93 Item Code D.61 – Uses 
If the country does not report the Item Codes in Table 4.1, Table 2.1 contains the following field: 
Plus  Taxes on products minus subsidies on products – SNA Item Codes D.21 – D.31 
While data collected from Table 4.1 is disaggregated, data from Table 2.1 is possibly incomplete since it does not include 
income or wealth taxes or social contributions. However, many of the countries for which data is only available in Table 2.1 may 
not collect income or wealth taxes and social contributions. Their primary tax source is then production or value added taxes or 
tariffs, so that the majority of tax collections is reflected in Table 2.1. Social benefits, part of Table 4.1, were collected and 
netted against the gross tax rate. The current reported tax rate is thus net of any subsidies in the form of production or trade 
subsidies or social benefits. Individual countries (US, Japan, BRICS) as well as the largest countries in each bloc of the model 
have been verified on the basis of IMF International Financial Statistics and national statistics offices. For these countries, net 
taxes in the model database were adjusted to match government deficits (and surpluses) relative to GDP. Specifically, Eurozone 
as well as European countries’ government deficit to GDP ratio was adjusted based on publications from the German national 
statistics office; Brazil and Mexico based on data from IADB (Inter American Development Bank); US based on US BEA (Bureau 
of Economic Analysis); Australia, China, India, South Korea and Japan based on data from ADB (Asian Development Bank); 
Russia based on data from EEG (Economic Expert Group, http://www.eeg.ru/pages/345) in association with the Ministry of 
Finance; Turkey and South Africa from respective national Treasury Departments.  
 
Bilateral trade matrix: The principal source for the bilateral trade matrix is the IMF’s DOTS (Direction of Trade Statistics), 
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exports and imports. The import matrix includes “cost insurance and freight,” often at a uniform rate of ten per cent across 
partner countries due to the general lack of data. Since imports are a cost item to the domestic firm in the model, the data used 
here relies mostly on the import matrix. Only where the export matrix provided additional data was it included. The DOTS data 
is aggregated into the region by region matrix that fits the model’s aggregation scheme. Intra-regional trade is not accounted 
for. The DOTS database covers only merchandise trade. In order to account for trade in services – and, in fact, for the overall 
current account – imports in the aggregated bilateral trade matrix have been scaled to reflect current accounts from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. While this represents a crude adjustment, it is feasible, whereas more complicated measures 
would require a global bilateral services trade matrix – which is not available. 
 
Employment and unemployment data: The following is a description of employment and unemployment data. In brief: 
Population, labor force, employment and unemployment data stems from national statistics offices, regional development 
banks as well as ILO’s Laborsta and Eapep databases. Reported unemployment rates are used where available, estimates based 
on the highest quality underlying data where not. Regional unemployment rates are calculated as GDP-weighted averages. 
More detail follows: From ILO’s Laborsta, Tables 1A, 2B, and 3D from the ILO laborsta database were used. 1A contains the total 
economically active population by country, and in some cases the total population. The years of data availability varied from 
2000 to 2008. 2B contains the employed population by country. The years of data availability varied from 2000 to 2008, were 
matched when possible to the dates in Table 1A. Table 3D contains the unemployed population by country. The years of data 
availability varied from 2000 to 2008, and were matched to the date in Table 2B. From Eurostat, employment and 
unemployment rates are used for all countries where available. US and Canadian data is from national statistics offices. Asian 
country data, where available, was gleaned from ADB (Asian Development Bank). Data for Latin American and Carribean 
countries is from IADB (Inter-American Development Bank). Selected countries have been verified against World Bank data. The 
timeliness and detail of employment and unemployment data varies widely by country. The approach was to use the best 
available data for each country. ILO’s Eapep data base yields a 2008 estimate of the labor force for each country in the sample, 
and is used when other data is not available. In combination with employment levels from national, regional and multilateral 
sources, or Laborsta if not available, the unemployment rate can be calculated.  
 
Functional distribution of income: Principally, wage shares are the total wage bill or employee compensation relative GDP 
at factor cost. Estimates of wage shares are often not readily available for developing countries due to the importance of 
informal activities. Ideally, employee compensation as well as GDP at factor cost collected for formal economic activities should 
be adjusted by estimates for informal economic activities. Since labor productivity in the latter tends to be very low, this would 
represent an upward adjustment of the wage share. Where data was not available, reasonable adjustments have been made. 
The wage shares are reported in Table 4. Data was collected from the following sources: (1) EUROPA – Economic and Financial 
Affairs – Indicators – AMECO database. The Ameco database calculates wage shares as compensation per employee relative to 
GDP at factor cost per employee. The Ameco data is the basis for wage share estimates with a source denotation as “EU”; (2) 
ILO/IILS: Charpe, M. ‘All_WS_MC_INST.xls’ (International Labour Organization and International Institue for Labour Studies, 
2008). These wage shares have been adjusted by a factor to include the self-employed. In the table, wage shares from this 
source are denoted as “ILO.” (3) Rada (2010) and (4) Vasiliouk (2008).  
 
Import elasticities: The trade structure requires price and income elasticities of import demand. See Table 5. The 
elasticities are either based on the author's calculations or taken from the literature. Data is taken from IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). Quarterly data was used in all countries except for Venezuela, Egypt, and Pakistan. We use Import 
Volume and Gross Domestic Product Volume indexed to 2005 for ease of comparison. For the price elasticity we calculated a 
relative price, if both the import price and GDP deflator were available. The relative price is calculated by using the implicit 
price deflator of imports divided by the implicit price deflator of domestic GDP. Where import prices were not available, the 
Real Effective Exchange Rate was used for the price elasticity calculation. This was also indexed to 2005 to provide continuity. 
Price and income elasticities are calculated using both a log-linear model and a first difference log-linear model. The primary 
log-linear model follows the classical paper by Houthakker and Magee (1969). The first difference model is a differenced version 
of the Houthakker-Magee model seen in much of the trade elasticity literature including Marquez (2002). The primary 
regression in both cases uses OLS methods to regress the logarithm of the volume of imports on the logarithm of both domestic 
GDP and the relative price. The data for each country was tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The 
results were chosen based on their tests for stationarity and their statistical significance. In most cases data was used from 
1990 to 2009 in all countries where the elasticity was self calculated. The exceptions to this date range were Morocco (1990 to 
2008),South Africa (1990 to 2006), Brazil (1995-2009), and Argentina (1993-2009).  For countries where data was unavailable or 
elasticity estimates were unreliable using conventional methods, the most recent papers from the trade elasticity literature 
were used. Using data from 1984 to 2003, Kwack et al. (refered to as KALY in table 5) use an OLS method for 30 countries using 
pooled cross country time series. The authors use a log linear model controlling for the geographical distance between the 
capital city of the importing country and the capital city of the exporting country. Ivanova (2007) uses a vector error correction 
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